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Abstract
The paper develops a model of directed search on the job where transitions of work-
ers between unemployment, employment and across employers are driven by hetero-
geneity in the quality of ﬁrm-worker matches. The equilibrium is such that the agents’
value and policy functions are independent of the distribution of workers across em-
ployment states. Hence, the model can be solved outside of steady-state and used to
measure the eﬀect of cyclical productivity shocks on the labor market. Productivity
shocks are found to generate large ﬂuctuations in workers’ transitions, unemployment
and vacancies when matches are experience good, but not when matches are inspection
goods.
1 Introduction
In the US labor market, workers move frequently between employment, unemployment and
across diﬀerent employers. On average, the rate at which unemployed workers move into
employment (henceforth, the UE rate) is 42 percent a month, the rate at which employed
workers move into unemployment (the EU rate) is 2.6 percent a month, and the rate at
which workers move from one employer to the other (the EE rate) is 2.9 percent a month.
These transition rates are not only large, but they are also very volatile at the business
cycle frequency (relative to labor productivity), thus contributing to the large volatility of
unemployment and vacancies. As documented in Table 1, the UE, EU and EE rates are ﬁve
times as volatile as labor productivity, and the unemployment and vacancy rates are more
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0than ten times as volatile as labor productivity. Moreover, the cyclical ﬂuctuations in the
UE, EU and EE rates display a clear pattern of correlations with the cyclical ﬂuctuations in
unemployment and vacancies. As documented in Table 1, the UE and EE rates are strongly
negatively correlated with unemployment and positively correlated with vacancies, and the
EU rate is strongly positively correlated with unemployment and negatively correlated with
vacancies.
This paper proposes a model of directed search on the job in which the workers’ tran-
sitions between employment, unemployment and across diﬀerent employers are driven by
heterogeneity in the quality of diﬀerent ﬁrm-worker matches. Like models of random search
on the job (e.g. Burdett and Mortensen 1998, Postel-Vinay and Robin 2002), our model
can account for the frequency and pattern of the transition of individual workers across
employment states. Unlike models of random search on the job, our model can be easily
solved in and out of steady-state and, hence, it can be used to study the behavior of workers’
transitions, unemployment and vacancies over the business cycle.
In this paper, we use our model to measure the response of the labor market to cyclical
ﬂuctuations in aggregate productivity. We ﬁnd that this response critically depends on
whether the quality of a ﬁrm-worker match is observed before or after the match is created.
If the quality is observed after the match is created (i.e. if matches are experience goods),
aggregate productivity shocks generate large ﬂuctuations in unemployment, vacancies and
workers’ transition rates. If the quality is observed before the match is created (i.e. if
matches are inspection goods), the eﬀect of aggregate productivity shocks on the labor
market is negligible.
In our model, the search process is directed–as in Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996)–
rather than random–as in Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985). On one side of the
market, ﬁrms choose how many and what type of vacancies to create. On the other side of
t h em a r k e t ,w o r k e r sc h o o s ew h a tt y p eo fv a c a n c i e st os e a r c h .T h et y p eo fav a c a n c yi sd e ﬁned
by the conditions under which it hires a worker, and by the value of the employment contract
that it oﬀers to a new hire. Workers and vacancies searching for each other are brought into
contact by a constant return to scale meeting function. Upon meeting, a worker and a ﬁrm
observe a signal about the idiosyncratic productivity (i.e. quality) of their match. If the
signal meets the conditions speciﬁed by the vacancy’s type, the worker and the ﬁrm begin
to produce and, eventually, observe the actual quality of their match. If the signal does not
meet those conditions, the worker returns to his previous employment position. Depending
on the informativeness of the signal, the model captures diﬀerent views about the matching
process. If the signal is completely uninformative, a match is an experience good. If the
signal is perfectly informative, a match is an inspection good. If the signal contains some
1but not all information, a match is partly an inspection and partly an experience good.
In the theoretical part of the paper, we formulate the social planner’s problem and char-
acterize its solution. Then, we prove that there exists a unique equilibrium for the market
economy. This equilibrium is block recursive, in the sense that the agents’ value and pol-
icy functions depend on the aggregate state of the economy only through the realization of
the aggregate shocks, and not through the entire distribution of workers across employment
states (i.e. unemployment and employment in diﬀerent matches). Because of this prop-
erty, we can solve our model with heterogeneous agents and aggregate shocks as easily as
one would solve a representative agent model. Moreover, we prove that the equilibrium is
eﬃcient, in the sense that it decentralizes the social planner’s allocation. Because of this
property, we can characterize the behavior of the economy using the ﬁrst order conditions
of the planner’s problem.
The equilibrium is block recursive because the search process is directed. In fact, with
directed search, workers in diﬀerent employment states choose to search for diﬀerent types of
vacancies. Workers in low-value employment states (i.e. unemployment and employment in
low quality matches) choose to search for vacancies that oﬀer a low value but are easy to ﬁnd
(because the number of vacancies per applicant is high). Workers in high-value employment
states (i.e. employment in high quality matches) choose to search for vacancies that oﬀer a
high value but are hard to ﬁnd. As a result of this self-selection process, a ﬁrm that opens a
particular type of vacancy knows that it will meet only one type of worker. Hence, the ﬁrm’s
expected value from meeting a worker does not depend on the distribution of workers across
employment states and, because of ﬁrms’ free entry, the probability that the ﬁrm meets an
applicant must have the same property. In turn, the fact that the meeting probabilities are
independent of the distribution of workers across employment states is suﬃcient to guarantee
that the agents’ value and policy functions will also be independent of the distribution.
In the quantitative part of the paper, we consider two versions of the model that, a
priori, provide an equally plausible description of the labor market. Speciﬁcally, we consider
a version of the model in which matches are experience goods, and a version in which
matches are inspection goods. We calibrate the parameters of these two versions of the model
using data on the frequency at which workers move between employment, unemployment
and across diﬀerent employers, as well as data on the relationship between tenure and the
frequency at which workers leave their jobs.
Given the calibrated parameter values, we simulate the two versions of the model to
measure the eﬀect of aggregate productivity shocks on the labor market. When matches are
experience goods, we ﬁnd that the ﬂuctuations in unemployment, vacancies and workers’
transition rates generated by productivity shocks display the same pattern of comovement
2as in the data. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the volatility of unemployment, vacancies and work-
ers’ transition rates generated by productivity shocks accounts for a large fraction of the
empirical volatility of these variables. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that productivity shocks generate
ﬂuctuations in the UE, EU and EE rates that are (respectively) 3, 6 and 5 times larger than
the ﬂuctuations in the average productivity of labor, and ﬂuctuations in unemployment and
vacancies that are (respectively) 8 and 3 times larger than the ﬂuctuations in average pro-
ductivity. In contrast, when matches are inspection goods, we ﬁnd that productivity shocks
account only for a negligible fraction of the empirical volatility of the labor market. As we
will discuss in section 6, the diﬀerence between the predictions of the two versions of the
model is partly due to the fact that the informativeness of the signals aﬀects the way in
which the economy responds to the shocks (given the same parameter values), and partly
due to the fact that the informativeness of the signal aﬀects the calibrated parameter values.
The paper makes two contributions. On the theoretical side, the contribution of the paper
is to develop a model of search on the job that is rich enough to match the pattern of workers’
transitions between employment, unemployment and across employers, and tractable enough
to study business cycles. The model is tractable because the equilibrium is block recursive. In
earlier work, Shi (2009) proves the existence of a block recursive equilibrium for a stationary
model of directed search on the job. In this paper and in a companion piece (Menzio and
Shi, 2010a), we generalize proof of existence of a block recursive equilibrium to models of
directed search on the job with aggregate shocks. These generalizations are not trivial as
they require qualitatively diﬀerent existence proofs than in a stationary environment. In the
companion paper, where we consider a large class of employment contracts, we are only able
to prove that the model admits a block recursive equilibrium. In this paper, where we restrict
attention to bilaterally eﬃcient contracts, we are able to prove that the only equilibrium is
block recursive.
When the search process is random, models of search on the job are not block recursive,
in the sense that the agents’ value and policy functions depend on the entire distribution of
workers across employment states. For this reason, models of random search on the job are
diﬃcult to solve outside of the steady state. To circumvent this diﬃculty, the existing liter-
ature has had to impose some strong restrictions on the environment. For example, in order
to solve their models outside of the steady state, Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2009) and
Robin (2009) assume that rate at which workers and ﬁrms meet is exogenous. In contrast, in
our model, this contact rate is endogenous and it is the key channel through which aggregate
productivity shocks are transmitted to the workers’ transition rates and unemployment. Sim-
ilarly, in order to solve their models outside of the steady state, Mortensen (1994), Pissarides
(1994, 2000) and Ramey (2008) assume that an employed worker moves into unemployment
3before bargaining the wage with his new employer. Hence, these models cannot capture the
idea that on-the-job search aﬀects the competitiveness of the labor market. Moreover, these
models can only be solved outside of the steady state under the assumption that all matches
are identical at the time they are created. Hence, these models cannot be used to study the
cyclical behavior of the labor market when matches are inspection goods.
On the empirical side, the contribution of the paper is to measure the eﬀect of aggregate
productivity shocks on the labor market using a model that is calibrated to match the
frequency and pattern on the workers’ transitions between employment, unemployment and
across employers. By calibrating the model, we discover that search on the job and match
heterogeneity are both quantitatively important. By simulating the model, we discover that,
if matches are experience goods, productivity shocks can account for the empirical pattern
of comovement between unemployment, vacancies and workers’ transition rates and for a
large fraction of their empirical volatility. These ﬁndings are novel. In models that abstract
from search on the job and match heterogeneity (e.g. Shimer 2005), productivity shocks
generate very small movements in labor market variables. In models that allow for match
heterogeneity but abstract from search on the job (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides 1994,
Merz 1995), productivity shocks generate a counterfactual comovement between vacancies,
unemployment and workers’ transition rates. We explain these diﬀerences at the end of
section 5. Our ﬁndings are also diﬀerent from Ramey (2008) who, using the model of random
s e a r c ho nt h ej o bb yM o r t e n s e n( 1 9 9 4 ) ,ﬁnds that productivity shocks generate implausibly
small movements in the UE rate1,2.M o r e o v e r ,w eﬁnd that, if matches are inspection goods,
productivity shocks account for a very small fraction of the empirical volatility of the labor
market. This ﬁnding is novel since, as far as we know, there are no other papers that study
the cyclical behavior of the labor market using a model in which matches are inspection
goods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the physical
environment of the economy, formulate the social planner’s problem and characterize its
1There are two diﬀerences between our measurement exercise and Ramey’s (2008) that might account
for the diﬀe r e n c e si nt h er e s u l t s . F i r s t ,w eu s eam o d e lo fd i r e c t e ds e a r c ho nt h ej o b ,w h i l eh eu s e sa
model of random search on the job by Mortensen (1994). As we have already discussed, there are important
economic diﬀerences between these models. Second, while we calibrate all the parameters of the model to
match the frequency and pattern of the transition of individual workers between employment states, Ramey
chooses some parameters arbitrarily (e.g. the eﬃciency of search on the job and the scale and shape of the
distribution of match-speciﬁc productivity).
2There are other, less related papers that study business cycle dynamics using models of search on the
job. Nagypál (2007) studies a model of random search on the job in which workers have private information
about the amenity value of their jobs. Using a calibrated version of the model, she ﬁnds that productivity
shocks generate large ﬂuctuations in unemployment and vacancies. Krause and Lubik (2007) reach simi-
lar conclusions using a model of segmented search on the job with two diﬀerent types of vacancies. The
ampliﬁcation mechanism in these models is very diﬀe r e n tt h a ni no u r s .
4solution. In section 3, we describe the structure of the labor market and prove that its
equilibrium is unique, eﬃcient and block recursive. In section 4, we describe the strategy
that we adopt to calibrate the parameters of the model. In sections 5 and 6, we measure the
eﬀect of aggregate productivity shocks on the labor market using, ﬁrst, the version of the
model in which matches are experience goods and, then, the version in which matches are
inspection goods. Section 7 concludes. The proofs of all propositions and theorems are in
the appendix.
2 Planner’s Problem
2.1 Preferences and technologies
The economy is populated by a continuum of workers with measure 1 and a continuum of
ﬁrms with positive measure. Each worker is endowed with an indivisible unit of labor and
maximizes the expected sum of periodical consumption discounted at the factor β ∈ (0,1).
Each ﬁrm operates a constant return to scale technology that turns one unit of labor into
y +z units of output. The ﬁrst component of productivity, y,i sc o m m o nt oa l lﬁrms and its
value lies in the set Y = {y1,y 2,...,yN(y)},w h e r ey1 <y 2 <. . .<y N(y) and N(y) ≥ 2 is an
integer. The second component of productivity, z,i ss p e c i ﬁct oaﬁrm-worker pair, and its
value lies in the set Z = {z1,z 2,...,z N(z)},w h e r ez1 <z 2 < ... < zN(z) and N(z) ≥ 2 is an
integer.3 Each ﬁrm maximizes the expected sum of proﬁts discounted at the factor β.
Time is discrete and continues forever. At the beginning of each period, the state of
the economy can be summarized by the triple ψ =( y,u,g).T h eﬁrst element of ψ denotes
aggregate productivity, y ∈ Y . The second element denotes the measure of workers who are
unemployed, u ∈ [0,1]. The third element is a function g : Z → [0,1],w i t hg(z) denoting
the measure of workers who are employed in matches with the idiosyncratic productivity z.
Let Ψ denote the set in which ψ belongs.
Each period is divided into four stages: separation, search, matching and production.
At the separation stage, the planner chooses the probability d ∈ [δ,1] with which a match
between a ﬁrm and a worker is destroyed. The lower bound on d denotes the probability
that a match is destroyed for exogenous reasons, δ ∈ (0,1).
At the search stage, the planner sends workers and ﬁrms searching for new matches across
diﬀerent locations. Speciﬁc a l l y ,t h ep l a n n e rc h o o s e sh o wm a n yv a c a n c i e saﬁrm should open
3The assumption that y and z are discrete random variables simpliﬁes the notation but plays no role in
the derivation of our theoretical results. In fact, it is straightforward to generalize the proof of the linearity
o ft h ep l a n n e r ’ sp r o b l e m( T h e o r e m1 )a n dt h ep r o o fo fthe existence, uniqueness and block recursivity of
the equilibrium (Theorem 4) to the case in which y and z are continuous random variables. Moreover, the
assumption plays no role in the derivation of our quantitative results, because continuous random variables
would eventually have to be discretized in order to simulate the model.
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to search. The cost of maintaining a vacancy for one period is k>0.T h e w o r k e r h a s
the opportunity to search with a probability that depends on his employment status. If
the worker was unemployed at the beginning of the period, he can search with probability
λu ∈ [0,1]. If the worker was employed at the beginning of the period and did not lose his
job during the separation stage, he can search with probability λe ∈ [0,1]. Finally, if the
worker lost his job during the separation stage, he cannot search. As is standard in models
of directed search (e.g. Acemoglu and Shimer 1999, Burdett et al. 2001, and Shi 2001), the
planner ﬁnds it optimal to send workers in diﬀerent employment states (i.e. unemployment
a n de m p l o y m e n ti nam a t c ho ft y p ez)t os e a r c hi nd i ﬀerent locations, but has no incentive
to send workers in the same employment state to diﬀerent locations. Thus, there is no loss
in generality in assuming that there are exactly N(z)+1locations.
At the matching stage, the workers and the vacancies who are searching in the same
location are brought into contact by a meeting technology with constant returns to scale that
can be described in terms of the vacancy-to-worker ratio θ (i.e., the tightness). Speciﬁcally,
the probability that a worker meets a vacancy is p(θ),w h e r ep : R+ → [0,1] is a twice
continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave function which satisﬁes
the boundary conditions p(0) = 0 and p(∞)=1 . Similarly, the probability that a vacancy
meets a worker is q(θ),w h e r eq : R+ → [0,1] is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly
decreasing function such that q(θ)=p(θ)/θ, q(0) = 1 and q(∞)=0 .
When a ﬁrm and a worker meet, Nature draws the idiosyncratic productivity of their
match, z, from the probability distribution f(z), f : Z → [0,1]. Nature also draws a signal
about the idiosyncratic productivity of their match, s. With probability α ∈ [0,1], the signal
is equal to z; with probability 1−α, the signal is drawn from the distribution f independently
of z. After observing s but not z, the planner chooses whether to create the match or not.
If the planner chooses to create the match, the worker’s previous match is destroyed (if the
worker was employed). If the planner chooses not to create the match, the worker returns
t oh i sp r e v i o u ss t a t u s( u n e m p l o y m e n to re m p l o y m e n ti nt h ep r e v i o u sm a t c h ) .
Notice that the information structure above encompasses a number of interesting special
cases. If α =0 , the planner has no information about the quality of a match when choosing
whether to create it or not, in which case a match is a pure experience good.I fα =1 ,t h e
planner has perfect information about the quality of a match before choosing whether to
create it or not, in which case a match is a pure inspection good.I fα ∈ (0,1),am a t c hi s
partly an experience good and partly an inspection good.
A tt h ep r o d u c t i o ns t a g e ,a nu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e rp r o d u c e sb>0 units of output. A worker
6employed in a match with idiosyncratic productivity z produces y +z units of output4,a n d
z is observed. At the end of this stage, Nature draws next period’s aggregate component of
productivity, ˆ y, from the probability distribution φ(ˆ y|y), φ : Y × Y → [0,1]. Throughout
the paper, the caret indicates variables or functions in the next period.
2.2 Formulation of the planner’s problem
At the beginning of a period, the social planner observes the aggregate state of the economy
ψ =( y,u,g). At the separation stage, the planner chooses the probability d(z) of destroying
a match of quality z, d : Z → [δ,1]. At the search stage, the planner chooses θu,t h er a t i o
of vacancies to workers at the location where unemployed workers look for matches, and
θe(z), the ratio of vacancies to workers at the location where workers employed in matches of
quality z look for new matches, θu ∈ R+, θe : Z → R+. At the matching stage, the planner
chooses the probability cu(s) with which a meeting between an unemployed worker and a
ﬁrm is turned into a match given the signal s, cu : Z → [0,1]. Also, the planner chooses the
probability ce(s,z) with which a meeting between an employed worker and a ﬁrm is turned
into a match given the signal s, ce : Z × Z → [0,1]. Given the choices (d,θu,θ e,c u,c e),
aggregate consumption is given by
F(d,θu,θ e,c u,c e|ψ)=−k{λuθuu +
P
z [(1 − d(z))λeθe(z)g(z)]}+bˆ u+
P
z [(y + z)ˆ g(z)], (1)
where (ˆ u, ˆ g) denotes the distribution of workers across employment states at the production
stage and, hence, at the beginning of next period.
To compute ˆ u and ˆ g, it is useful to derive the transition probabilities for an individual
worker. First, consider a worker who enters the period unemployed. With probability
1 − λup(θu), the worker does not meet any ﬁrm at the matching stage. In this case, the
worker remains unemployed. With probability λup(θu), the worker meets a ﬁrm during
t h em a t c h i n gs t a g e . I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ew o r k e ra n dt h eﬁrm receive a signal s about the
quality of their match. With probability 1 −cu(s), the match is not created and the worker
remains unemployed. With probability cu(s)[α +( 1− α)f(s)], the match is created and its
4The assumption that y and z enter additively in the production function plays no role in the derivation
of our theoretical results. Indeed, we can prove Theorems 1 and 4 using a generic production function.
Moreover, the assumption does not appear to have a large eﬀect on our empirical ﬁndings. Indeed, we
ﬁnd that the predictions of the model regarding the eﬀect of aggregate productivity shocks on the labor
market are similar if we assume that y and z enter additively or multiplicatively in the production function.
Speciﬁcally, for the version of the model in which matches are experience goods, the volatility of the UE,
EU and EE rates generated by aggregate productivity shocks is, respectively, 2.5, 6.2 and 5.5 times larger
than the volatility of labor productivity if y and z are additive, and 2.3, 5.4 and 4.8 times larger if y and
z are multiplicative. The volatility of unemployment and vacancies is, respectively, 7.8 and 2.5 times larger
than the volatility of labor productivity if y and z are additive, and 7 and 2.3 times larger if y and z are
multiplicative.
7idiosyncratic productivity is z0 = s. With probability cu(s)(1−α)f(z0),t h em a t c hi sc r e a t e d
and its idiosyncratic productivity is z0 6= s. Overall, at the production stage, the worker is
unemployed with probability 1−λup(θu)mu,w h e r emu =
P
s [cu(s)f(s)], and he is employed
in a match of type z0 with probability λup(θu)[αcu(z0)+( 1− α)mu]f(z0). Next, consider a
worker who enters the period in a match of type z.I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a t ,a tt h ep r o d u c t i o n
stage, this worker is unemployed with probability d(z),h ei se m p l o y e di nt h es a m em a t c h
as at the beginning of the period with probability (1 − d(z)) (1 − λep(θe(z))me(z)),w h e r e
me(z)=
P
s [ce(s,z)f(s)], and he is employed in a new match of type z0 with probability
(1 − d(z))λep(θe(z)) [αce(z0,z)+( 1− α)me(z)] f(z0).
After aggregating the transition probabilities of individual workers, we ﬁnd that the
measure of workers who are unemployed at the production stage is given by
ˆ u = u[1 − λup(θu)mu]+
P
z [d(z)g(z)]. (2)
Similarly, the measure of workers who are employed in matches of type z0 is given by
ˆ g(z0)= uλup(θu)[αcu(z0)+( 1− α)mu]f(z0)
+g(z0)[1− d(z0)][1 − λep(θe(z0))me(z0)]
+
P
z g(z){[1 − d(z)][λep(θe(z))][αce(z0,z)+( 1− α)me(z)]f(z0)}.
(3)
The planner maximizes the sum of present and future consumption discounted at the
factor β. Hence, the planner’s value function, W(ψ), solves the following Bellman equation
W(ψ)= m a x (d,θu,θe,cu,ce) F(d,θu,θ e,c u,c e|ψ)+βEW(ˆ ψ)
s.t. (2) and (3), d : Z → [δ,1], θu ∈ R+,
θe : Z → R+, cu : Z → [0,1], ce : Z × Z → [0,1].
(4)
Throughout this paper, the expectation operator is taken over the future state of the aggre-
gate economy, ˆ ψ,u n l e s si ti ss p e c i ﬁed otherwise.
The planner’s problem depends on the aggregate productivity, y, the measure of workers
who are unemployed, u,a n dt h em e a s u r eo fw o r k e r sw h oa r ee m p l o y e di nt h eN(z) diﬀerent
types of matches, g.I fN(z) is large–as it is needed to properly calibrate and simulate the
model–solving the planner’s problem might be diﬃcult as it involves solving a functional
equation in which the unknown function has many dimensions. Theorem 1 below shows that
this potential diﬃculty does not arise in our model because the planner’s problem breaks
down into N(z)+1problems that only depend on the aggregate productivity y.
Theorem 1 (Separability of the planner’s problem): (i) The planner’s value function, W(ψ),
is the unique solution to (4). (ii) W(ψ) is linear in u and g. That is, W(ψ)=Wu(y)u +
P
z [We(z,y)g(z)],w h e r eWu(y) and We(z,y) are called the component value functions. The
8component value function Wu(y) is given by
Wu(y)= m a x
(θu,cu)
{−kλuθu +[ 1− λup(θu)mu][b + βEWu(ˆ y)]
+λup(θu)
P
z0 {[αcu(z0)+( 1− α)mu][y + z0 + βEWe(z0, ˆ y)]f(z0)}}
s.t. θu ∈ R+, cu : Z → [0,1].
(5)
The component value function We(z,y) is given by
We(z,y)= m a x
(d,θe,ce)
{d[b + βEWu(ˆ y)] − (1 − d)kλeθe
+(1 − d)[1− λep(θe)me][y + z + βEWe(z,ˆ y)]
+(1 − d)λep(θe)
P
z0 {[αce(z0)+( 1− α)me][y + z0 + βEWe(z0, ˆ y)]f(z0)}}
s.t. d ∈ [δ,1], θe ∈ R+, ce : Z → [0,1].
(6)







associated with (4) depend on ψ only through y and not through (u,g).
Each of the N(z)+1p l a n n e r ’ sp r o b l e m si sa s s o c i a t e dw i t haw o r k e ri nad i ﬀerent employ-
ment state (unemployment and employment in a match of diﬀerent quality). In the problem
associated with an unemployed worker, (5), the planner chooses θu and cu(s) to maximize
the present value of the output generated by this worker, net of the cost of the vacancies
assigned to him. Similarly, in the problem associated with a worker employed in a match
of type z, (6), the planner chooses d(z), θe(z) and ce(s,z) to maximize the present value
of the output generated by this worker, net of the cost of the vacancies assigned to him.
Since each of these worker-speciﬁc problems only depends on the aggregate productivity, y,
solving the planner’s problem in our model is just as easy as solving the planner’s problem
in a representative agent model.
The planner’s problem can be decomposed into worker-speciﬁc problems that only depend
on the aggregate productivity, y, because the search process is directed rather than random.
Under random search, the planner has to choose the same tightness for workers in diﬀerent
employment states, because all workers search in the same location. For this reason, the
planner’s problem cannot be decomposed into worker-speciﬁc problems and its solution will
depend not only on the aggregate productivity, y, but also on the distribution of workers
across employment states, (u,g). In contrast, under directed search, the planner can choose
ad i ﬀerent tightness for each diﬀerent worker, because diﬀerent workers search in diﬀerent
locations. This property, together with the linearity of the production function, is suﬃcient
to guarantee that the planner’s problem can be decomposed into N(z)+1worker-speciﬁc
problems that depend on the aggregate productivity, y, but not on the distribution of workers,
9(u,g).
2.3 Solution to the planner’s problem
The eﬃcient choice for the probability of turning a meeting between a ﬁr ma n da nu n e m -
ployed worker into a match is c∗
u(s,y)=1if
b + βEWu(ˆ y) ≤ α[y + s + βEWe(s, ˆ y)] + (1 − α)Ez0[y + z
0 + βEWe(z
0, ˆ y)], (7)
and c∗
u(s,y)=0otherwise, where s is the signal about the quality of the match. Similarly,
the eﬃcient choice for the probability of turning a meeting between a ﬁrm and an employed
worker into a match is c∗
e(s,z,y)=1if
y + z + βEWe(z,ˆ y) ≤ α[y + s + βEWe(s, ˆ y)] + (1 − α)Ez0[y + z
0 + βEWe(z
0, ˆ y)], (8)
and c∗
e(s,z,y)=0otherwise, where z is the quality of the worker’s current match and s is
the signal about the quality of the new match. These conditions are intuitive. The left hand
side in (7) and (8) is the value of keeping the worker in his current employment position
(unemployment and employment in a match of type z). The right hand side of (7) and (8)
is the value of moving the worker to the new match. This is equal to the value of a worker
employed in a match with idiosyncratic productivity z0,w h e r ez0 is equal to s with probability
α a n dt oav a l u ed r a w nr a n d o m l y from the distribution f with probability 1−α. The planner
ﬁnds it optimal to create the match if and only if the left hand side is smaller than the right
hand side. Notice that the left hand side of (7) is independent of s, while the right hand side
is strictly increasing in s. Hence, the creation probability c∗
u(s,y) is an increasing function
of s, and can be represented by a reservation signal r∗




u(s,y)=1if s ≥ r∗
u(y). For the same reason, the creation probability c∗
e(s,z,y) can
be represented by a reservation signal r∗




e(s,z,y)=1if s ≥ r∗
e(z,y). Moreover, since the right hand side of (8) is strictly increasing
in z, r∗
e(z,y) is increasing in z.
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u(y) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. Similarly, the eﬃc i e n tc h o i c ef o rt h ev a c a n c y -












α[s − z + βE(We(s, ˆ y) − We(z,ˆ y))]





e(z,y) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. We only discuss (10) as the two conditions
above are similar. The left-hand side is the marginal cost of increasing the vacancy-to-worker
ratio at the location visited by workers employed in matches of quality z. The right-hand
side is the marginal beneﬁt of increasing this vacancy-to-worker ratio, which is given by the
product of two terms. The ﬁrst term is the marginal increase in the probability with which
a worker employed in a match of quality z meets a ﬁrm. The second term is the value of a
meeting between a worker employed in a match of quality z and a ﬁrm. If θ
∗
e(z,y) is positive,
the marginal cost and the marginal beneﬁt of increasing the vacancy-to-worker ratio must be
e q u a l .O t h e r w i s e ,t h em a r g i n a lc o s tm u s tb eg r e a t e rt h a nt h em a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁt. Notice that
the left-hand side does not depend on z, while the right-hand side strictly decreases with z.
Hence, as long as θ
∗
e(z,y) > 0, the vacancy-to-worker ratio θ
∗
e(z,y) is a strictly decreasing
function of z.
Finally, the eﬃcient choice for the probability of destroying a match is d∗(z,y)=1if










e(z,y)][y + z0 + βEWe(z0, ˆ y)]},
(11)
and d∗(z,y)=δ otherwise, where z is the idiosyncratic productivity of the match. The
left-hand side of (11) is the value of a worker who is unemployed and does not have the
opportunity to search for a new match in the current period. This is the value of destroying
the match. The right-hand side is the value of a worker who is employed in a match of type
z and has the opportunity to search for a new match with probability λe.T h i si st h ev a l u e
of keeping the match alive. When the left-hand side is greater than the right-hand side, the
planner destroys the match with probability 1. Otherwise, Nature destroys the match with
probability δ. Notice that the left-hand side does not depend on z, while the right-hand side
is strictly increasing in z. Hence, the destruction probability d∗(z,y) is a decreasing function
of z, and can be represented by a reservation productivity r∗
d(y) such that d∗(z,y)=1if
z<r ∗
d(y) and d∗(z,y)=δ if z ≥ r∗
d(y).
We summarize the properties of the eﬃcient choices in the proposition below.
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(iii) There is r∗










11is increasing in z.( i v )θ
∗
e(z,y) is decreasing in z.
With respect to a standard search model (e.g. Pissarides 2000, Chapter 1), our model
identiﬁes a number of additional channels through w h i c ha na g g r e g a t ep r o d u c t i v i t ys h o c k





e but also r∗
u and r∗
e, an aggregate productivity shock may aﬀect not only the
probability that a worker meets a ﬁrm but also the probability that a meeting between a
ﬁrm and a worker turns into a match. Clearly, both channels may contribute to the response
of the UE and EE rates to an aggregate productivity shock. Second, by aﬀecting r∗
d,a n
aggregate productivity shock may aﬀect the probability that the match between a ﬁrm and
a worker is destroyed and, hence, it may aﬀect the EU rate. As we shall see in sections 5 and
6, the quantitative importance of these additional channels depends on the informativeness
of the signals, and on the shape of the distribution of match-speciﬁc productivity.
3 Decentralization
In this section, we describe a market economy that decentralizes the eﬃcient allocation. We
ﬁrst describe the structure of the labor market and the nature of the employment contracts.
We then derive the conditions on the individual agents’ value and policy functions that need
to be satisﬁed in the market equilibrium. Finally, we establish that there exists a unique
equilibrium for the market economy and that this equilibrium is eﬃcient, in the sense that it
decentralizes the solution to the planner’s problem, and block recursive, in the sense that the
agents’ value and policy functions depends on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ,o n l y
through the aggregate productivity, y,a n dn o tt h r o u g ht h ee n t i r ed i s t r i b u t i o no fw o r k e r s
across employment states, (u,g). The equilibrium is block recursive because, with directed
search, workers choose to search in diﬀerent submarkets.
3.1 Market economy
For the planner’s problem in section 2, we only needed to describe the physical environment
of the economy. For the analysis of equilibrium here, we also have to describe the structure
of the labor market and the nature of the employment contracts. We assume that the labor
market is organized in a continuum of submarkets indexed by (x,r), (x,r) ∈ R × Z,w h e r e
x is the value oﬀered by a ﬁrm to a worker and r is a selection criterion based on the signal
s. Speciﬁcally, when a ﬁrm meets a worker in submarket (x,r), it hires the worker if and
only if the signal s about the quality of their match is greater than or equal to r.I f t h e
ﬁrm hires the worker, it oﬀers him an employment contract worth x in lifetime utility. The
12vacancy-to-worker ratio of submarket (x,r) is denoted as θ(x,r,ψ). In equilibrium, θ(x,r,ψ)
will be consistent with the ﬁrms’ and workers’ search decisions.
At the separation stage, an employed worker moves into unemployment with probability
d ∈ [δ,1]. At the search stage, each ﬁrm chooses how many vacancies to create and in
which submarkets to locate them. On the other side of the market, each worker who has the
opportunity to search chooses which submarket to visit. At the matching stage, each worker
searching in submarket (x,r) meets a vacancy with probability p(θ(x,r,ψ)). Similarly, each
vacancy located in submarket (x,r) meets a worker with probability q(θ(x,r,ψ)).W h e na
worker and a vacancy meet in submarket (x,r), the hiring process fo l l o w st h er u l es p e c i ﬁed
for that submarket; i.e., the worker is hired if and only if the signal is higher than r and,
conditional on being hired, he receives the lifetime utility x. At the production stage, an
unemployed worker produces b u n i t so fo u t p u t ,a n daw o r k e re m p l o y e di nam a t c ho ft y p ez
produces y + z units of output.
We assume that the contracts oﬀered by ﬁrms to workers are bilaterally eﬃcient, in
the sense that they maximize the joint value of the match, i.e., the sum of the worker’s
lifetime utility and the ﬁrm’s lifetime proﬁts. We make this assumption because there are
a variety of speciﬁcations of the contract space under which the contracts that maximize
the proﬁts of the ﬁrm are, in fact, bilaterally eﬃcient. In a previous version of this paper
(Menzio and Shi 2009), we prove that the proﬁt maximizing contracts are bilaterally eﬃcient
if the contract space is complete, in the sense that a contract can specify the wage, w,t h e
separation probability, d, and the submarket where the worker searches while on the job,
(xe,r e), as functions of the history of the aggregate state of the economy, ψ,a n dt h eq u a l i t y
of the match, z. This result is intuitive. The ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts by choosing the
contingencies for d, xe and re so as to maximize the joint value of the match and by choosing
the contingencies for w so as to deliver the promised value x. Moreover, we can prove that
the proﬁt maximizing contracts are bilaterally eﬃcient even if they can only specify the wage
as a function of tenure and productivity (while the separation and search decisions are made
by the worker). This result is also intuitive. The ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts by choosing the
wage in the ﬁrst period of the employment relationship so as to deliver the promised value x,
and by choosing the wage in the subsequent periods so as to induce the worker to maximize
the joint value of the match (this is accomplished by setting the wage equal to the product
of the match). Alternatively, proﬁt maximizing contracts are bilaterally eﬃcient if they can
specify severance transfers that induce the worker to internalize the eﬀect of his separation
and search decisions on the proﬁts of the ﬁrm.
133.2 The problem of the worker and the ﬁrm
First, consider an unemployed worker at the beginning of the production stage, and let
Vu(ψ) denote his lifetime utility. In the current period, the worker produces and consumes
b units of output. In next period, the worker matches with a vacancy with probability
λup(θ(x,r,ψ))m(r), where (x,r) is the submarket where the worker searches and m(r)=
P
s≥r f(s) is the probability that the signal about the quality of the match is above the
selection cutoﬀ r. If the worker matches with a vacancy, his continuation utility is x.I ft h e




Vu(ˆ ψ)+λuD(x,r,Vu(ˆ ψ), ˆ ψ)
o
,( 1 2 )
where D is deﬁned as
D(x,r,V,ψ)=p(θ(x,r,ψ))m(r)(x − V ),( 1 3 )
We denote as (xu(ˆ ψ),r u(ˆ ψ)) the policy functions for the optimal choices in (12).
Second, consider a worker and a ﬁrm who are matched at the beginning of the production
stage. Let Ve(z,ψ) denote the sum of the worker’s lifetime utility and the ﬁrm’s lifetime
proﬁts. In the current period, the sum of the worker’s utility and the ﬁrm’s proﬁti se q u a lt o
the output of the match, y + z. In the next period, the worker and the ﬁr ms e p a r a t ea tt h e
matching stage with probability d, in which case the worker’s continuation utility is Vu(ˆ ψ) and
the ﬁrm’s continuation proﬁti sz e r o .T h ew o r k e ra n dt h eﬁrm separate at the next matching
stage with probability (1−d)[λep(θ(x,r,ψ))m(r)], where (x,r) is the submarket where the
worker searches for a new match. In this case, the continuation utility of the worker is x and
the ﬁrm’s continuation proﬁt is zero. Finally, the worker and the ﬁrm remain together until
the next production stage with probability (1−d)[1−λep(θ(x,r,ψ))m(r)], in which case the
sum of the worker’s continuation utility and the ﬁrm’s continuation proﬁti sVe(z, ˆ ψ).T h u s ,
Ve(z,ψ)=y + z + βE max
(d,x,r)
n
dV u(ˆ ψ)+( 1− d)
h
Ve(z, ˆ ψ)+λeD(x,r,Ve(z, ˆ ψ), ˆ ψ)
io
(14)
where D is the function deﬁn e di n( 1 3 ) . W ed e n o t ea sd(z, ˆ ψ) and (xe(z, ˆ ψ),r e(z, ˆ ψ)) the
p o l i c yf u n c t i o n sf o rt h eo p t i m a lc h o i c e si n( 1 4 ) .
At the search stage, a ﬁrm chooses how many vacancies to create and where to locate
them. The ﬁrm’s cost of creating a vacancy in submarket (x,r) is k.T h eﬁrm’s beneﬁtf r o m
creating a vacancy in submarket (x,r) is
q(θ(x,r,ψ))
P
s≥r {[αVe(s,ψ)+( 1− α)EzVe(z,ψ) − x]f(s)}, (15)
14where q(θ(x,r,ψ)) is the probability of meeting a worker, Ve(s,ψ) is the joint value of the
match if the signal is correct, EzVe(z,ψ) is the joint value of the match if the signal is not
correct, and x is the part of the joint value of the match that the ﬁrm delivers to the worker.
When the cost is strictly greater than the beneﬁt, the ﬁrm does not create any vacancy
in submarket (x,r). When the cost is strictly smaller than the beneﬁt, the ﬁrm creates
inﬁnitely many vacancies in submarket (x,r).A n dw h e nt h ec o s ta n dt h eb e n e ﬁta r ee q u a l ,
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is independent of the number of vacancies it creates in submarket (x,r).
In any submarket visited by a positive number of workers, the tightness θ(x,r,ψ) is
consistent with the ﬁrm’s incentives to create vacancies if and only if
k ≥ q(θ(x,r,ψ))
P
s≥r {[αVe(s,ψ)+( 1− α)EzVe(z,ψ) − x]f(s)}, (16)
and θ(x,r,ψ) ≥ 0 with complementary slackness. In any submarket that workers do not
visit, the tightness θ(x,r,ψ) is consistent with the ﬁrm’s incentives to create vacancies if and
only if k is greater or equal than (15). However, following the literature on directed search
on the job with heterogeneous workers (i.e. Shi 2009, Menzio and Shi 2010 a,2 0 1 0b,a n d
Gonzalez and Shi, 2010), we restrict attention to equilibria in which θ(x,r,ψ) satisﬁes the
above complementary slackness condition in every submarket.5
3.3 Equilibrium, block recursivity and eﬃciency
Deﬁnition 3 A Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) consists of a market tightness function
θ : R × Z × Y → R+, a value function for the unemployed worker Vu : Y → R,ap o l i c y
function for the unemployed worker (xu,r u):Y → R×Z, a joint value function for the ﬁrm-
worker match Ve : Z ×Y → R, and policy functions for the ﬁrm-worker match d : Z ×Y →
[δ,1] and (xe,r e):Z × Y → R × Z. These functions satisfy the following conditions:
(i) θ(x,r,y) satisﬁes (16) for all (x,r,ψ) ∈ R × Z × Ψ;
(ii) Vu(y) satisﬁes (12) for all ψ ∈ Ψ,a n d(xu(y),r u(y)) are the associated policy functions;
(iii) Ve(z,y) satisﬁes (14) for all (z,y) ∈ Z × Ψ,a n dd(z,y) and (xe(z,y),r e(z,y)) are the
associated policy functions.
Condition (i) guarantees that the search strategy of an unemployed worker maximizes
his lifetime utility, given the market tightness function θ. Condition (ii) guarantees that
5This assumption pins down the tightness of an inactive submarket by a ﬁrm’s indiﬀerence condition.
That is, the tightness is such that a ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt from visiting any inactive submarket is equal to
the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt from visiting one of the active submarkets. A justiﬁcation for this assumption
comes from the following thought experiment. Imagine a sequential game in which unemployed workers
choose (with a tremble) where to look for vacancies and, then, ﬁrms choose where to create their vacancies.
Because of the tremble, the tightness is well deﬁned everywhere. As the probability of the tremble goes to
zero, the tightness of every submarket remains well deﬁned and converges to the one given by (16).
15the employment contract maximizes the sum of the worker’s lifetime utility and the ﬁrm’s
lifetime proﬁts, given the market tightness function θ. Condition (iii) guarantees that the
market tightness function θ is consistent with the ﬁrm’s incentives to create vacancies. Taken
together, conditions (i)-(iii) insure that in a BRE, just like in a recursive equilibrium, the
strategies of each agent are optimal given the strategies of the other agents. However,
unlike in a recursive equilibrium, in a BRE, the agent’s value and policy functions depend
on the aggregate state of the economy, ψ, only through the aggregate productivity, y,a n d
not through the distribution of workers across diﬀerent employment states, (u,g).F o rt h i s
reason, a BRE is much easier to solve than a recursive equilibrium. But does a BRE exist?
And why should we focus on a BRE rather than on a recursive equilibrium?
The following theorem answers these questions. Speciﬁcally, the theorem establishes
that a BRE exists, that a BRE is unique and that it decentralizes the solution to the social
planner’s problem. Moreover, the theorem establishes that there is no loss in generality in
focusing on the BRE because all equilibria are block recursive.
Theorem 4 (Block recursivity, uniqueness and eﬃciency of equilibrium):(i) All equilibria
are block recursive. (ii) There exists a unique BRE. (iii) The BRE is socially eﬃcient in
the sense that: (a) θ(xu(y),r u(y),y)=θ
∗
u(y),a n dru(y)=r∗





The equilibrium is block recursive because searching workers are endogenously separated
in diﬀerent markets and, as in the social planner’s problem, such separation is possible
only when search is directed. To explain why directed search induces workers to separate
endogenously, note that workers choose in whi c hs u b m a r k e tt os e a r c hi no r d e rt om a x i m i z e
the product between the probability of ﬁnding a new match and the value of moving from
their current employment position to the new match. For a worker in a low-value employment
position (unemployment or employment in a low quality match), it is optimal to search in a
submarket where the probability of ﬁnding a new match is relatively high and the value of the
match is relatively low. For a worker in a high-value employment position (i.e., employment
in a high quality match), it is optimal to search in a submarket where the probability of
ﬁnding a new match is relatively low and the value of the match is relatively high. Overall,
workers in diﬀerent employment positions choose to search in diﬀerent submarkets. As a
result of the self-selection of workers, a ﬁrm that opens a vacancy in submarket (x,r) knows
that it will only meet one type of worker. For this reason, the expected value to the ﬁrm from
meeting a worker in submarket (x,r) does not depend on the entire distribution of workers
across employment states and, because of the free entry condition (16), the probability
that a ﬁrm meets a worker in submarket (x,r) has the same property. Since the meeting
16probability across diﬀerent submarkets is independent from the distribution of workers across
employment states, it is easy to see from (12) and (14) that the value of unemployment and
the joint value of a match will also be independent from the distribution.
If we replaced the assumption of directed search with random search, the equilibrium
could not be block recursive. Under random search, workers in high and low-value em-
ployment positions all have to search in the same market. When this is the case, the ﬁrm’s
expected value from meeting a worker depends on how workers are distributed across diﬀerent
employment positions, as this distribution determines the probability that the employment
contract oﬀered by the ﬁrm will be accepted by a randomly selected worker. In turn, the free-
entry condition implies that the probability that a ﬁrm meets a worker must also depend
on the distribution of workers. Since the meeting probability between ﬁrms and workers
depends on the distribution, so do all of the agents’ value and policy functions.6
It is important to clarify that the assumption of bilaterally eﬃcient contracts is not nec-
essary for establishing the existence of a block recursive equilibrium. In fact, in some of our
work (Shi 2009, Menzio and Shi 2010 a,2 0 1 0b), we have shown that block recursive equi-
libria exist also in economies where the contract space is so limited that bilateral eﬃciency
cannot be attained (e.g., economies in which contracts can only specify a wage that remains
constant over the entire duration of an employment relationship).
However, we use of the assumption of bilaterally eﬃcient contracts in order to establish
the equivalence between the block recursive equilibrium and the social plan, and to rule out
equilibria that are not block recursive. When contracts are bilaterally eﬃcient, the joint
value of a match to the ﬁrm and the worker satisﬁes the equilibrium condition (14). After
















One can easily verify that (17) is satisﬁe dn o to n l yb yt h ej o i n tv a l u eo fam a t c ht ot h e
ﬁrm and the worker, Ve(z,ψ), but also by the value of an employed worker to the planner,
y + z + βEWe(z,ˆ y). Moreover, one can easily verify that the functional equation (17) is a
contraction mapping and, hence, it admits a unique solution. Therefore, the joint value of a
match to the ﬁrm and the worker must be equal to the value of an employed worker to the
6One should clearly distinguish block recursivity from the property that the market tightness is indepen-
dent of unemployment in simple models of random search (e.g. Pissarides 1985, Mortensen and Pissarides
1994). The latter feature arises only when searching workers are identical, so that a vacancy knows exactly
the type of worker it will meet. In fact, when there is on-the-job search or when searching workers are
heterogeneous ex ante, random search will cause the market tightness to depend on their distribution.
17planner. Similarly, one can establish the equivalence between the value of unemployment
t oaw o r k e r ,Vu(ψ), and the value of an unemployed worker to the planner, b + βEWu(ˆ y).
The equivalence between the value functions of individual agents and the component value
functions of the planner is suﬃcient for establishing that any equilibrium is eﬃcient and
block recursive.
4C a l i b r a t i o n
In the previous two sections, we have developed a directed search model of workers’ transi-
tions between employment, unemployment and across diﬀerent employers. In this section,
we calibrate the parameters of the model using data on the movements of workers across em-
ployment states in the US labor market. In the next two sections, we will use the calibrated
model to measure the eﬀect of aggregate productivity shocks on unemployment, vacancies
and workers’ transition rates. We carry out this quantitative analysis for the version of the
model in which matches are pure experience goods (i.e. α =0 )a n df o rt h eo n ei nw h i c h
matches are pure inspection goods (i.e. α =1 ).
Households’ preferences are described by the discount factor β and the value of leisure
b. Firms’ technology is described by the vacancy cost k, the distribution of match-speciﬁc
productivity f, the stochastic process for the aggregate component of productivity φ,a n dt h e
exogenous match-destruction probability δ. We restrict f to be a 200 point approximation of
a Weibull distribution with mean μz,s h a p eνz,a n ds c a l eσz.7 We also restrict the stochastic
process for aggregate productivity to be a 3-state Markov process with unconditional mean
μy, autocorrelation ρz, and standard deviation σy. The matching process is described by
the search probabilities λu and λe, the meeting probability p, and the precision of the signal
about the quality of a new match, α. As in most of the related literature (e.g. Shimer 2005
and Mortensen and Nagypál 2007), we restrict p(θ) to be of the form min{θ
γ,1}, γ ∈ (0,1).
In order to calibrate the parameters of the model, we use data on the transitions of
workers across employment states in the US labor market (see Appendix D for details). We
choose the model period to be one month8.W en o r m a l i z eλu to 1 and choose the parameters


























where Γ is the gamma function. The parameters νz and σz control respectively the shape and the variance of
the distribution. In particular, the shape of the Weibull distribution is similar to the shape of the exponential
distribution for νz =1 , to the lognormal distribution for νz =2 , to the normal distribution for νz =4 ,a n d
to a left-skewed version of a normal distribution for νz =1 0 . To keep the calibration manageable, we restrict
attention to these four values of νz.
8In our benchmark calibration, workers can only change employment status once a month. However, in
18λe, k,a n dδ so that the average UE, EU and EE rates are the same in the model as in
the data. We set the value of γ so that the model matches the empirical elasticity of the
UE rate with respect to the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio. We set the value of b so that
the model matches the empirical ratio of labor productivity at home and in the market as
measured by Hall and Milgrom (2008). We normalize μz to 0 and choose the values of νz
and σz that minimize the distance between the distribution of workers across tenure lengths
generated by the model and its empirical counterpart. Finally, we normalize μy to 1 and
choose ρy and σy to match the empirical autocorrelation and standard deviation of average
labor productivity.
Most of the calibration strategy outlined above is standard (see e.g. Shimer 2005).
The main novelty is to calibrate the shape and scale of the distribution of match-speciﬁc
productivities using the empirical tenure distribution.9 Let us brieﬂye x p l a i nw h yt h e s et w o
distributions are related. In the model, matches with diﬀerent idiosyncratic productivity
have a diﬀerent probability of surviving from one year to the next. In particular, a low
productivity match has a lower survival probability than a high productivity match because
a worker employed in a low productivity match is more likely to move into unemployment
and into a new match. This implies that the distribution of the match-speciﬁcp r o d u c t i v i t y
among newly aﬀects the fraction of matches that survives for t years and, consequently, the
cross-sectional tenure distribution. Figure 1 shows the ﬁt of the empirical tenure distribution
obtained with the experience and inspection versions of the model.
Table 2 summarizes the calibration outcomes. Notice that, for the version of the model
in which matches are experience goods, search on the job and match heterogeneity (the two
central elements of our model) are both quantitatively important. The search probability
f o ra ne m p l o y e dw o r k e r ,λe, is 73 percent per month, nearly as high as the search probability
for an unemployed worker. The scale of the distribution of match-speciﬁc productivity σz is
0.95, which implies that a match at the 90th percentile of the distribution is nearly twice as
productive as a match at the 10th percentile. For the version of the model in which matches
are inspection goods, the calibrated value of λe is even higher, while the calibrated value of
σz is lower.
the data, some workers experience multiple changes in their employment status within a month. As pointed
out by Shimer (2005), this discrepancy between the model and the data may lead to biased estimates of the
parameters of the model and to a mis-measurement of the causes of business cycle ﬂuctuations. In order to
address this potential concern, we calibrated and simulated a biweekly version of our model. We found that
aggregate productivity shocks have a similar eﬀect on workers’ transition rates, unemployment and vacancies
w h e t h e rw eu s et h eb i w e e k l yo rt h em o n t h l yv e r s i o no ft h em o d e l .
9This identiﬁcation strategy has a precedent in Moscarini (2003), who considers a model of random search
on the job in which workers and ﬁrms learn over time the quality of their match by observing their output.
He uses the empirical tenure distribution to identify the precision of output as a signal of match quality.
195 Experience model
In this section, we study the eﬀect of aggregate productivity shocks on unemployment,
vacancies and workers’ transition rates for the version of the model in which matches are
experience goods. In this version of the model, workers and ﬁrms have no information about
the quality of their match before starting production. Hence, every time a worker and a ﬁrm
meet, they match. An unemployed worker is hired as soon as he meets a ﬁrm. After the
worker is hired, he begins production and observes the quality of the match with his employer.
I ft h eq u a l i t yo ft h em a t c hi ss u ﬃciently low, the worker returns into unemployment. If the
quality of the match is suﬃciently high, the worker stays in the match and stops searching
(i.e. he searches in submarkets without vacancies). If the quality of the match takes on
intermediate values, the worker stays in the match but continues searching and moves to
a n o t h e re m p l o y e ra ss o o na sh em e e t so n e .
5.1 The eﬀect of aggregate productivity shocks
We examine the response of the economy to a positive shock to the aggregate component
of productivity (henceforth, y-shock). Speciﬁcally, we carry out the following experiment.
The economy at time t =0is at the steady state associated with the average realization of
aggregate productivity. That is, at time t =0 , the aggregate component of productivity y
is given by μy and the distribution of workers across employment states (u,g) is given by
the ergodic distribution associated with μy.A t t i m e t =1 , aggregate productivity jumps
up by 1 percent and, afterwards, remains at this higher level. Figures 2 through 4 illustrate
the response of unemployment, vacancies and workers’ transition rates to this aggregate
productivity shock.
To better understand these responses, it is useful to discuss the eﬀect of the y-shock on
the policy functions rd, θu and θe.T h e y-shock lowers rd, the cutoﬀ on the idiosyncratic
component of productivity below which matches are endogenously destroyed. Intuitively,
an increase in aggregate productivity raises the social value of employment relative to un-
employment, and so it lowers the threshold on the idiosyncratic productivity below which
it more eﬃcient to break up a match than to maintain it. The y-shock increases θu,t h e
tightness of the submarket where unemployed workers look for jobs. Intuitively, an increase
in aggregate productivity increases the social value of moving workers out of unemployment
and into employment and, hence, it increases the eﬃcient vacancy-to-applicant ratio of the
submarket visited by unemployed workers.
The eﬀect of the y-shock on θe(z), the tightness of the submarket where workers employed
in matches of quality z look for new jobs, is more complicated. In fact, the y-shock increases
20θe(z) for low values of z, and it lowers θe(z) for high values of z. It is easy to explain this
phenomenon. A positive shock to y raises the social value of a high quality match relative
to a low quality match, because a worker employed in a better match is more likely to be
e m p l o y e di nt h ef u t u r ea n d ,h e n c e ,m o r el i k e l yt ot a k ea d v a n t a g eo ft h ei n c r e a s ei ny.F o r
this reason, a positive shock to y increases (decreases)t h es o c i a lv a l u eo fm o v i n gaw o r k e r
from a low (high)q u a l i t ym a t c ht oan e wm a t c h ,a n ds oi ti n c r e a s e s( decreases)t h ee ﬃcient
vacancy-to-applicant ratio in the submarket visited by workers who are currently employed
in low (high) quality matches.
F i g u r e2s h o w st h er e s p o n s et ot h ey-shock of the UE rate, hue = θ
γ
u,t h eE Ur a t e ,
heu =[
P
d(z)g(z)]/(1−u),a n dE Er a t e ,hee =[
P
(1 − d(z))λeθe(z)γ]/(1−u).T h eU Er a t e
goes up because the increase in θu raises the probability than an unemployed worker ﬁnds a
j o b .T h eE Ur a t ef a l l sb e c a u s et h ed e c l i n ei nrd lowers the fraction of new matches that are
destroyed after their idiosyncratic productivity is revealed. On impact, the EE rate increases
b e c a u s eo fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ea v e r a g et i g h t n e s so ft h es u b m a r k e t sw h e r ee m p l o y e dw o r k e r s
look for new jobs. Over time, the EE rate continues to grow because the distribution of
employed workers shifts towards matches with lower idiosyncratic productivity, which have
a higher probability of terminating with a job-to-job transition. Quantitatively, the 1 percent
increase in y leads to a 2 percent increase in the steady state UE rate, a 4 percent decline
in the steady state EU rate, and to a 4 percent increase in the steady state EE rate. As a
result of both the increase in the UE rate and the decline in the EU rate, the steady state
unemployment rate falls by 6 percent.
Figure 3 shows the response to the y-shock of the number of vacancies created for
unemployed workers, vu = uθu, the number of vacancies created for employed workers,
ve =
P
(1−d(z))λeθe(z)g(z), and the total number of vacancies in the economy, v = vu+ve.
On impact, vu increases because of the increase in the number of vacancies that are created
for each unemployed worker. Over time, as the number of unemployed workers falls towards
its new steady state value, vu returns to its initial level and then falls below it. The response
of ve is diﬀerent. On impact, ve jumps up because of the increase in the average number of
vacancies created for each employed worker. Over time, as the number of employed workers
grows towards its new steady state value, ve continues to increase. Quantitatively, the 1
percent increase in y leads to a 2.5 percent decline in the steady state value of vu and to a
5 percent increase in the steady state value of ve.S i n c ev = vu + ve and vu ∼ ve, the steady
state number of vacancies increases by 2 percent.
Figure 4 shows the response of the average idiosyncratic productivity, z =[
P
zg(z)]/(1−
u), and the average labor productivity, π = y+z.T h ey-shock has two opposing eﬀects on z.
On the one hand, the y-shock tends to lower z because it lowers the endogenous destruction
21cutoﬀ zd. On the other hand, the y-shock tends to increase z because it increases the
probability that a worker employed in a low quality match ﬁnds a better job. In practice,
the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second one, and the 1 percent increase in y l e a d st oa0 . 3p e r c e n t
decline in the steady state value of z.S i n c eπ = y + z and z ∼ y/3, the 1 percent increase
in y leads to a 0.7 percent increase in the steady state value of average labor productivity.
Let us summarize our ﬁndings. According to the version of our model in which matches
are experience goods, an aggregate productivity shock induces unemployment to move in
the opposite direction than the UE and EE rates, vacancies and labor productivity, and in
t h es a m ed i r e c t i o na st h eE Ur a t e . T a b l e1s h o w st h a tt h i si se x a c t l yt h es a m ep a t t e r n
of comovement that is observed in the US labor market at the business cycle frequency.
Moreover, according to our model, an aggregate productivity shock induces movements in
unemployment, vacancy and workers’ transition rates that are large relative to the move-
ment in the average productivity of labor π.S p e c i ﬁcally, the response of unemployment is
approximately 8 times larger than the response of π. The response of vacancies is 3 times
larger than the response of π. And the response of the UE, EU and EE rates is respectively
2, 6 and 5 times larger than the response of π. Table 1 shows that the volatility generated by
the aggregate productivity shock constitutes a large fraction of the overall volatility observed
in the US labor market at the business cycle frequency. In the US data, unemployment is
10 times more volatile than π, vacancies are 11 times more volatile than π,a n dt h eU E ,
EU and EE rates are approximately 5 times more volatile than π. Finally, Table 3 shows
that the implications of our model are substantially the same if, instead of looking at the
response to a y-shock, we simulate the stochastic economy and compute the volatility of the
model-generated time series for unemployment, vacancies and workers’ transition rates.
5.2 Role of match heterogeneity and search on the job
In section 4, we showed that the model needs match heterogeneity and search on the job in
order to ﬁt the main acyclical features of worker reallocation in the US labor market. Here,
we show that these two features of the model are also needed in order to properly measure
the eﬀect of aggregate productivity ﬂuctuations on the US labor market. To make this point
precise, we calibrate and simulate two constrained versions of the model. First, we calibrate
and simulate a version of the model in which the parameters λe and σz are constrained to
be zero and, hence, matches are homogeneous and search only takes place oﬀ the job. We
refer to this version of our model as P-00 because it is equivalent to the textbook model by
Pissarides (2000, Chapter 1). Second, we calibrate and simulate a version of the model in
which σz is allowed to be positive but λe is constrained to be zero and, hence, search on the
job is ruled out. We refer to this version of the model as MP-94 because it is very similar to
22the classic model by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
The top half of Table 4 presents a statistical summary of the eﬀe c tt h a ta g g r e g a t ep r o d u c -
tivity shocks have on unemployment, vacancies and workers’ transition rates in P-00. Note
that y-shocks generate nearly ten times less unemployment volatility in P-00 than in our
model. This striking diﬀerence is due to the fact that y-shocks generate much less volatility
in both the UE and EU rates in P-00 than they do in our model. It is easy to explain why
the volatility of the UE rate is lower in P-00. The elasticity of the UE rate with respect to y
is given by the product between the elasticity of the job ﬁnding probability with respect to
the vacancy-to-applicant ratio, γ, and the elasticity of the vacancy-to-applicant ratio in the
submarket visited by unemployed workers with respect to y, i.e. dlog(vu/u)/dlogy.T h e
value of dlog(vu/u)/dlogy is similar in the two models. However, the value of γ is much
smaller in P-00 than in our model. To understand this, remember that γ is chosen so that
the elasticity of the UE rate with respect to the vacancy-to-applicant ratio is the same as in
the data (0.27). That is, γ is chosen so that
dloghue
dlog(v/u)




In our model, dlog(v/u) is twice as large as dlog(vu/u) because the elasticity of the number
of vacancies created for employed workers is higher than the elasticity of the number of
vacancies created for unemployed workers. Hence, in our model, γ =0 .6.I nP - 0 0 ,dlog(v/u)
equals dlog(vu/u) because, without search on the job, there are no vacancies created for
employed workers. Hence, in P-00, γ =0 .27.
It is also easy to explain why the volatility of the EU rate is lower in P-00 than in our
model. In our model, a shock to the aggregate component of productivity aﬀects the EU rate
b e c a u s ei ta ﬀects the cutoﬀ rd on the idiosyncratic component of productivity below which a
match is endogenously destroyed. Quantitatively, the eﬀe c to nt h eE Ur a t ei sl a r g eb e c a u s e ,
according to the calibration, the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity has a high density
around the steady state value of rd. In P-00, the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity is
constrained to be degenerate at z =0 , and so an aggregate productivity shock has no eﬀect
on the EU rate.
In light of these observations, it is clear why models that abstract from match heterogene-
ity and search on the job typically predict that the response of the unemployment rate to
aggregate productivity shocks is implausibly small (e.g. Shimer 2005) unless additional am-
pliﬁcation mechanisms are introduced (e.g. training costs in Mortensen and Nagypál 2007,
countercyclical vacancy costs in Shao and Silos 2009, exogenous wage rigidity in Hall 2005
and Gertler and Trigari 2009, endogenous wage stickiness in Menzio 2005, Kennan 2010, and
23M e n z i oa n dM o e n2 0 1 0 ) .
The bottom half of Table 4 presents a statistical summary of the eﬀe c tt h a ta g g r e g a t e
productivity shocks have on unemployment, vacancies and workers’ transition rates in MP-
9 4 .I nM P - 9 4 ,t h ev o l a t i l i t yo ft h eU Er a t ei sn e a r l y3t i m e ss m a l l e rt h a ni no u rm o d e la n d
the volatility of the EU rate is approximately the same as in our model. As a result, the
volatility of the unemployment rate is approximately 30 percent lower in MP-94 than in our
model. These ﬁndings are easy to explain. The volatility of the EU rate is similar in the two
models because the calibrated distribution of the idiosyncratic productivity is similar and
because the aggregate productivity shocks have a similar eﬀect on the destruction cutoﬀ rd.
The volatility of the UE rate is lower in MP-94 because the calibrated value of γ is smaller
(for exactly the same reason why it is smaller in P-00).
Next, note that the correlation between total vacancies and labor productivity is negative
in MP-94, while it is positive in our model. Let us explain this diﬀerence. In our model, a
positive shock to y generates a decline in the number of vacancies created for unemployed
workers, vu, and an increase in the number of vacancies created for employed workers, ve.
Since the second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst one, a positive y-shock leads to an increase in the
total number of vacancies in the economy, v.I n M P - 9 4 , a p o s i t i v e y-shock also generates
a decline in vu. This is because the fall in the EU rate is so large that the increase in the
number of vacancies created for each unemployed worker, θu, is dominated by the decline in
the number of unemployed workers, u.H o w e v e r ,i nM P - 9 4 ,ap o s i t i v ey-shock has no eﬀect
on ve because, without search on the job, ﬁrms do not create any vacancies for employed
workers. Hence, in MP-94, the total number of vacancies in the economy falls in response to
a positive aggregate productivity shock.
These observations explain why models that abstract from search on the job tend to
predict a positive correlation between vacancies and unemployment whenever the EU rate
is strongly countercyclical either for endogenous reasons (e.g. movements in the endogenous
destruction cutoﬀ rd as in Mortensen and Pissarides 1994 and Merz 1995) or for exogenous
reasons (e.g. shocks to the match destruction probability as in Shimer 2005).10
10In a paper contemporaneous to ours, Ramey (2008) makes a similar point. Speciﬁcally, using a model
of random search on the job, Ramey shows that the correlation between unemployment and vacancies
generated by aggregate productivity shocks is positive when employed workers are not allowed to search,
and it is negative when employed workers search as frequently as unemployed workers. There are two
diﬀerences between this result and ours. First, our result is obtained using a model of directed search, while
Ramey’s result is obtained using the random search model by Mortensen (1994). As we discussed in the
introduction, there are important economic diﬀerences between these two models. Second, Ramey shows that
the correlation between unemployment and vacancies is negative when employed workers search as frequently
as unemployed workers. This arbitrary assumption might drive Ramey’s result as it is likely to overestimate
the importance of search on the job. In contrast, in this paper, the frequency at which employed workers
get the opportunity to search is calibrated to match the average EE rate observed in the data.
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In this section, we study the eﬀect of a 1 percent increase in aggregate productivity on un-
e m p l o y m e n t ,v a c a n c i e sa n dw o r k e r s ’t r a n s i t i o nr a t e sf o rt h ev e r s i o no ft h em o d e li nw h i c h
matches are inspection goods. In this version of the model, workers and ﬁrms receive a per-
fectly informative signal about the quality of their match before starting production. Hence,
an unemployed worker searches oﬀ the job until he ﬁnds a match that is more valuable than
unemployment. Similarly, an employed worker searches on the job until he ﬁnds a match that
is more valuable than the one he has with his current employer. Note that, since the value
of all matches that are created is greater than the value of unemployment, employed workers
move back into unemployment only when their match is hit by the exogenous destruction
shock δ.
In the version of the model where matches are inspection goods, the +1% shock to y
increases θu, the tightness of the submarket where unemployed workers look for matches,
and it lowers ru,t h ec u t o ﬀ on the idiosyncratic productivity above which a match between an
unemployed worker and a ﬁrm is created. Intuitively, an increase in aggregate productivity
increases the social value of employment relative to unemployment and, for this reason, it
increases the eﬃcient vacancy-to-applicant ratio and it lowers the eﬃcient creation cutoﬀ in
the submarket visited by unemployed workers. For the same reason, the positive shock to y
lowers rd,t h ec u t o ﬀ on the idiosyncratic productivity below which a match is endogenously
destroyed.
In contrast, the y-shock has no eﬀect on θe(z) and re(z), the tightness and the creation
cutoﬀ in the submarket where workers employed in matches of quality z look for new jobs. It
is easy to explain this eﬀect. An increase in y raises the social value of matches with diﬀerent
quality by exactly the same amount, because workers employed in matches with diﬀerent
quality have exactly the same probability of being employed in the future (i.e. 1 − δ)a n d ,
hence, the same probability of taking advantage of the increase in y. For this reason, an
increase in y has no eﬀect on the social value of moving a worker from a match of quality
z to a new match, and so it has no eﬀect on the eﬃcient vacancy-to-applicant ratio, θe(z),
and the eﬃcient creation cutoﬀ, re(z).
F i g u r e5s h o w st h er e s p o n s et ot h ey-shock of the UE rate, hue = θ
γ
umu,E Ur a t e ,
hue =[
P
d(z)g(z)]/(1 − u),a n dE Er a t e ,hee =[
P
(1 − d(z))λeθe(z)γme(z)g(z)]/(1 − u).
The UE rate increases for two reasons. First, the increase in θu increases the probability that
an unemployed worker meets a ﬁrm. Second, the decline in ru increases the probability that
a meeting between an unemployed worker and a ﬁrm turns into a match. Quantitatively,
the steady state UE rate increases by 0.8 percent. The EE rate increases because of a
25composition eﬀect. The shock aﬀects neither θe(z) nor re(z) and, hence, it aﬀects neither
the probability that a worker employed in a match of quality z meets a new ﬁrm, nor the
probability that such a meeting turns into a match. However, because it lowers ru,t h ey-
shock shifts the distribution of employed workers towards matches with lower quality, which
have a higher probability of terminating with a job-to-job transition. Quantitatively, the
steady state EE rate increases by 0.05 percent. The EU rate does not respond to the shock.
This result is intuitive. Since the quality of a match is perfectly observed before the match
is created, a worker moves from employment to unemployment only when the match is
hit by the destruction shock, an event which occurs with the exogenous and time-invariant
probability δ. From the response of the workers’ transition rates, it follows that the steady
state unemployment rate falls by 0.75 percent.
Figure 6 shows how the y-shock aﬀects the number of vacancies for unemployed workers,
vu, the number of vacancies for employed workers, ve, and the total number of vacancies in
the economy, v. The steady state value of vu increases because the increase in the number
of vacancies created per each unemployed workers, θu, is stronger than the decline in the
number of unemployed workers, u. The steady state value of ve increases both because of
an increase in the average number of vacancies created for each employed worker, Eθe(z),
and because of an increase in the number of employed workers, 1 − u. Quantitatively, the
steady state value of vu increases by 2.5 percent and the steady state value of ve increases
by 0.1 percent. Since v = vu + ve and vu ∼ ve, the steady state value of v increases by 2.75
percent. Finally, Figure 7 shows that the y-shock decreases the average quality of a match
by 0.05 percent and increases the average productivity of labor by 0.99 percent.
Overall, the response to the y-shock of unemployment, vacancies and workers’ transi-
tion rates is much smaller in the version of the model where matches are inspection rather
than experience goods. In particular, the response of unemployment (relative to average
productivity) is 10 times smaller when matches are inspection goods, due to both a smaller
decline in the EU rate and a smaller increase in the UE rate. It is not surprising that the
decline in the EU rate is muted when matches are inspection goods. However, it is somewhat
surprising that the increase in the UE rate is smaller when matches are inspection goods
considering that, in this version of the model, the y-shock increases not only the probability
that an unemployed worker meets a ﬁrm but also the probability that the meeting turns into
a match. There is a simple explanation for this result. The elasticity of the UE rate with










The parameter γ is calibrated so as to match the empirical elasticity of the UE rate with
26respect to the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio, i.e.
dloghue
dlog(v/u)
=0 .27 =⇒ γ =
0.27 dlog(v/u) − dlogmu
dlog(θu)
. (20)







The previous expression demonstrates that, once γ is calibrated, the elasticity of the UE rate
with respect to y does not depend on the elasticity of the probability with which a meeting
turns into a match. It only depends on the empirical elasticity of the UE rate with respect
to v/u a n do nt h ee l a s t i c i t yo fv/u with respect to y. And since the elasticity of v/u with
respect to y is smaller when matches are inspection goods (due to the smaller response in
ve), so is the elasticity of the UE rate.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we developed a model of directed search on the job in which the transitions of
workers between employment, unemployment and across diﬀe r e n te m p l o y e r sa r ed r i v e nb y
heterogeneity in the quality of diﬀerent ﬁrm-worker matches. In the theoretical part of the
paper, we proved that the unique equilibrium is eﬃcient, in the sense that it decentralizes the
solution to the planner’s problem, and block recursive, in the sense that the agents’ value and
policy functions depend on the aggregate state of the economy only through the realization
of aggregate shocks and not through the entire distribution of workers across employment
states (unemployment and employment in diﬀerent matches). Because the equilibrium is
block recursive, the model can be easily solved outside of the steady state and, hence, used
for studying the cyclical dynamics of the labor market. In the empirical part of the paper, we
ﬁrst calibrated the model to match the frequency and pattern of the transition of individual
workers across employment states. We then simulated the model to measure the eﬀect
that cyclical ﬂuctuations in aggregate productivity have on the labor market. We found
that, when matches are experience goods, aggregate productivity shocks account for the
empirical pattern of comovement between unemployment, vacancies and workers’ transition
rates and for a large fraction of their empirical volatility. In contrast, when matches are
inspection goods, aggregate productivity shocks can only account for a negligible fraction of
the empirical volatility of the labor market.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
(i) Let C(Ψ) be the set of bounded continuous functions R : Ψ → R with the sup norm,kRk =
supψ∈Ψ R(ψ).D e ﬁne the operator T on C(Ψ) by
(TR)(ψ)=m a x (d,θu,θe,cu,ce) F(d,θu,θ e,c u,c e|ψ)+βER(ˆ ψ)
s.t. ˆ u = u[1 − λup(θu)mu]+
P
z [d(z)g(z)],
ˆ g(z0)=uλup(θu)[αcu(z0)+( 1− α)mu]f(z0)
+g(z0)[1− d(z0)][1 − λep(θe(z0))me(z0)]
+
P
z g(z){[1 − d(z)][λep(θe(z))][αce(z0,z)+( 1− α)me(z)]f(z0)}
d : Z → [δ,1], θu ∈ R+, θe : Z → R+, cu : Z → [0,1], ce : Z × Z → [0,1].
(A1)
The return function F is deﬁned as
F(d,θu,θ e,c u,c e|ψ)=−k{λuθuu +
P
z [(1 − d(z))λeθe(z)g(z)]} + bˆ u +
P
z [(y + z)ˆ g(z)].
(A2)
First, we prove that TRis bounded. Take an arbitrary R ∈ C(Ψ).S i n c eR is bounded, there
exists R and R such that R≤ R(ˆ ψ) ≤ R for all ˆ ψ ∈ Ψ. Hence, (TR)(ψ) is bounded above by
belowby(N(z)+1 )m i n {b,y1+z1}+βRand it is bounded above by (N(z)+1 )m a x {b,yN(y)+
zN(z)} + βR.N o w ,w ep r o v et h a tTR is continuous in ψ.L e tθ be deﬁned as
θ = k
−1 ©





Note that the maximand in (A1) is strictly smaller than (N(z)+1 )m i n {b,y1+z1}+βR for
any θu > θ or for any θe(z) > θ. Therefore, the problem in (A1) is equivalent to the problem
in which the constraint θu ∈ R+ is replaced with θu ∈ [0,θ],a n dt h ec o n s t r a i n tθe : Z → R+
is replaced with θe : Z → [0,θ].F o rt h em o d i ﬁed problem, the maximand is continuous in
(ψ,d,θu,θ e,c u,c e) and set of feasible choices for (d,θu,θ e,c u,c e) is compact. Then it follows
from the Theorem of the Maximum (Theorem 3.6 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott, 1989) that
TR is continuous in ψ. Hence: T : C(Ψ) → C(Ψ).
The operator T maps the set of bounded continuous function C(Ψ) into itself, and one
can easily verify that it satisﬁes the monotonicity and discounting hypotheses in Blackwell’s
suﬃcient conditions for a contraction (Theorem 3.3 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott, 1989).
Hence, the operator T is a contraction mapping and it admits one and only one ﬁxed point
R∗ ∈ C(Ψ).S i n c elimt→∞ β
tR∗(ψ)=0for all ψ ∈ Ψ, it follows from Theorem 4.3 in Stokey,
28Lucas and Prescott (1989) that R∗ is equal to the planner’s value function W.
(ii) Let C0(Ψ) ⊂ C(Ψ) be the set of functions R : Ψ → R that are bounded, continuous and
linear in the measure of unemployed workers, u, and in the measure of workers employed
in matches of type z, g(z). Clearly, R ∈ C0(Ψ) if and only if there exist two functions




Consider an arbitrary function R in C0(Ψ). Then, after substituting the constraints into
the maximand of (A1), we obtain
(TR)(ψ)= ˆ Ru(y)u +
P
z ˆ Re(z,y)g(z), (A4)
where ˆ Ru(y) is given by
ˆ Ru(y)= m a x
(θu,cu)
{−kλuθu +( 1− λup(θu)mu)[b + βERu(ˆ y)]
+λup(θu)
P
z0 [αcu(z0)+( 1− α)mu][y + z0 + βERe(z0, ˆ y)]f(z0)}
s.t. θu ∈ R+, cu : Z → [0,1].
(A5)
and ˆ Re(z,y) is given by
ˆ Re(z,y)= m a x
(d,θe,ce)
{d[b + βERu(ˆ y)] − (1 − d)kλeθe
+(1 − d)(1− λep(θe)me)[y + z + βERe(z,ˆ y)]
+(1 − d)λep(θe)
P
z0 [αce(z0)+( 1− α)me][y + z0 + βERe(z0, ˆ y)]f(z0)}
s.t. d ∈ [δ,1], θe ∈ R+, ce : Z → [0,1].
(A6)
Since R is an arbitrary function in C0(Ψ), (A4) implies that T : C0(Ψ) → C0(Ψ).M o r e o v e r ,
since C0(Ψ) is a closed subset of C(Ψ) and T : C0(Ψ) → C0(Ψ), Corollary 1 to Theorem 3.2
in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989) implies W ∈ C0(Ψ).
(iii) Let C00(Ψ) ⊂ C0(Ψ) be the set of functions R : Ψ → R such that the associated
component Re is nondecreasing in z.L e tR be an arbitrary function in C00(Ψ).F r o mp a r t
(ii), it follows that TR ∈ C0(Ψ) and the associated components ˆ Ru and ˆ Re satisfy the
equations (A5) and (A6). Since the maximand in (A6) is nondecreasing in z and the feasible
set in (A6) is independent of z, ˆ Re is nondecreasing in z. Hence, T : C00(Ψ) → C00(Ψ).S i n c e
C00(Ψ) is a closed subset of C(Ψ), Corollary 1 to Theorem 3.2 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott
(1989) implies that W ∈ C00(Ψ).
(iv) From part (ii), it follows that the policy correspondences (θ
∗
u,c ∗
u) solve the maximization
problem (A5) for (Ru,R e)=( Wu,W e). Since the maximand and the constraints in (A5) do
29not depend on (u,g), (θ
∗
u,c ∗
u) depend on ψ only through y and not through (u,g). Similarly,
the policy correspondences (d∗,θ
∗
e,c ∗
e) solve the maximization problem (A6) for (Ru,R e)=




depend on ψ only through y and not through (u,g). ¥
B Proof of Proposition 2
For any y ∈ Y , θ
∗
u(y) and c∗
u(z,y) are the solutions to the maximization problem
max
(θu,cu)
{−kλuθu +( 1− λup(θu)mu)[b + βEWu(ˆ y)]
+λup(θu)
P
z0 [αcu(z0)+( 1− α)mu][y + z0 + βEWe(z0, ˆ y)]f(z0)}
s.t. θu ∈ [0,θ], cu : Z → [0,1].
(A7)
which can be rewritten as
max
θu∈[0,θ]








First, consider the inner maximization problem in (A8). The maximand is linear in cu
and its derivative with respect to cu(s) is given by
α[y + s + βEWe(s, ˆ y)] + (1 − α)Ez0[y + z
0 + βEWe(z
0, ˆ y)] − b − βEWu(ˆ y). (A9)
Hence, the solution to the maximization problem is c∗
u(s,y)=1if (A9) is positive, and
c∗
u(s,y)=0if (A9) is strictly negative. Therefore, c∗
u(s,y) is unique. Moreover, since (A9) is
increasing in s, c∗
u(s,y) is increasing in s. Therefore, there exists r∗
u(y) such that c∗
u(s,y)=1
if s ≥ r∗
u(y),a n dc∗
u(s,y)=0else. This completes the proof of parts (i) and (iii) of the
proposition for c∗
u.
Next, consider the outer maximization problem in (A8). The derivative of the maximand







α[y + s − b + βE(We(s, ˆ y) − Wu(ˆ y))]
+(1 − α)Ez0 [y + z0 − b + βE(We(z0, ˆ y) − Wu(ˆ y))]
)
f(s). (A10)
The expression above is strictly decreasing in θu because p00(θu) < 0, and it is strictly negative
at θu = θ because p0(θ)=0 . Hence, the solution to the maximization problem, θ
∗
u(y), is









α[y + s − b + βE(We(s, ˆ y) − Wu(ˆ y))]





u(y) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. This completes the proof of part (i) of the
proposition for θ
∗
u. The proofs of parts (i) and (iii) for c∗
e, θ
∗
e and d∗,a sw e l la st h ep r o o f so f
p a r t s( i i )a n d( i v )a r eo m i t t e df o rt h es a k eo fb r e v i t y . ¥
C Proof of Theorem 4
(i)-(ii) Let (θ,Vu,V e,x u,r u,d,x e,r e) be an equilibrium. We take ﬁve steps to prove that the
equilibrium is unique and block recursive.
Step 1. Unify the notation for Vu and Ve. Let the function V : {0,1}×Z × Ψ → R
be deﬁned as V (0,z,y)=Vu(ψ) for all (z,ψ) ∈ Z × Ψ,a n dV (1,z,y)=Ve(z,ψ) for all












dV (0,z,ˆ ψ)+( 1− d)V (1,z,ˆ ψ)
+(1 − d)λep(θ(x,r,ψ))m(r)
h




















Step 2. Express the value oﬀered in submarket x as a function of the tightness θ, the
reservation signal r, and the aggregate state of the economy ψ.L e tx(θ,r,ψ) denote the value
oﬀered to a worker in a submarket with tightness θ(x,r,ψ)=θ>0. From the equilibrium











In any submarket with θ(x,r,ψ)=0 ,t h ev a l u eo ﬀered to a worker cannot be expressed
uniquely as a function of (θ,r,ψ). However, the value oﬀered to a worker in these submarkets
is irrelevant because the worker meets a vacancy with zero probability. Hence, without loss
in generality, let x(θ,r,ψ)=0in all submarkets with tightness θ(x,r,ψ)=θ =0 .
Step 3. Reformulate the equilibrium condition for V . Substituting x with x(θ,r,ψ) and








































Step 4. Establish the uniqueness of V and its independence from (u,g).L e t Ω =
{0,1}×Z × Ψ and let C(Ω) denote the space of bounded continuous functions R : Ω → R,
with the sup norm. Let T : C(Ω) → C(Ω) denote the operator associated with (A14). It
is straightforward to verify that: (i) R,R0 ∈ C(Ω) and R ≤ R0 implies T(R) ≤ T(R0);
(ii) R ∈ C(Ω) and   ≥ 0 implies T(R +  )=TR+ β . Therefore, by Blackwell’s suﬃcient
conditions, it follows that the operator T is a contraction and that it admits a unique solution.
Hence, V is unique. Next, notice that if R depends on ˆ ψ only through ˆ y,t h e nT(R) depends
on ψ only through y. Hence, the ﬁxed point of the operator T depends on ψ only through
y.T h a ti s ,V (a,y,ψ)=V (a,z,y).
Step 5. Establish the uniqueness of the policy functions (θ,xu,r u,d,x e,r e) and their
independence from (u,g).S i n c eV (a,z,ψ) only depends on ψ through y,w ec a nr e w r i t et h e
equilibrium condition (16) as
k ≥ q(θ(x,r,ψ))
P
s≥r {[αVe(s,y)+( 1− α)EzVe(z,y) − x]f(s)} (A15)
and θ(x,r,ψ) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. It is easy to verify that θ(x,r,ψ) is
unique and only depends on ψ through y;t h a ti s ,θ(x,r,ψ)=θ(x,r,y).S i n c eV (a,z,ψ) and
θ(x,r,y) only depend on ψ through y, we can rewrite the equilibrium condition (12) as
Vu(y)=b + βEmax
(x,r)
{Vu(ˆ y)+λup(θ(x,r, ˆ y))m(r)[x − Vu(ˆ y)]}. (A16)
Since the maximization problem in (A16) only depends on ˆ ψ through ˆ y, the associated policy
functions (xu(ˆ ψ),r u(ˆ ψ))o n l yd e p e n do nˆ ψ through ˆ y. That is (xu(ˆ ψ),r u(ˆ ψ)) = (xu(ˆ y),r u(ˆ y)).
Similarly, we can show that the policy functions d(ˆ ψ) and (xe(ˆ ψ),r e(ˆ ψ))o n l yd e p e n do nˆ ψ
through ˆ y. That is, d(ˆ ψ)=d(ˆ y) and (xe(ˆ ψ),r e(ˆ ψ)) = (xe(ˆ y),r e(ˆ y)). This completes the proof
that there exists a unique equilibrium and that this equilibrium is block recursive.
(iii) To establish the equivalence between the equilibrium and the planner’s allocation, we
rewrite the component value functions (5) and (6). Recall that, in the planner’s allocation, a
32match is formed if and only if the signal s i sg r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt ot h ec u t o ﬀ level r∗
u(y) for
an unemployed worker and r∗
e(z,y) for a worker employed in a type-z match (see Proposition
2). Using ru and re as the choices instead of (cu,c e), we can rewrite (5) as
Wu(y)= m a x
(θu,ru)
{−kλuθu +( 1− λup(θu)mu)[b + βEWu(ˆ y)]
+λup(θu)
P








{d[b + βEWu(ˆ y)] − (1 − d)kλeθe
+(1 − d)(1− λep(θe)me)[y + z + βEWe(z,ˆ y)]
+(1 − d)λep(θe)
P




Using these equations, we can verify that (A14) is satisﬁed by the function W0(a,z,y) deﬁned
as W0(0,z,y)=b + βEWu(ˆ y) and W0(1,z,y)=y + z + βEWe(z,ˆ y).S i n c eV is the unique
solution to (A14), it follows that Vu(y)=b + βEWu(ˆ y) and Ve(z,y)=y + z + βEWe(z,ˆ y).
Finally, notice that the equilibrium allocation solves the maximization problems in (A14),
while the eﬃcient allocation solves the maximization problems in (A17) and (A18). With
the relations Vu(y)=b + βEWu(ˆ y) and Ve(z,y)=y + z + βEWe(z,ˆ y),i ti sn o td i ﬃcult to
see that the two sets of allocations coincide. ¥
D Data and calibration
We choose the model period to be one month. We set β so that the real interest rate in the
model is 5 percent per year. We choose k and δ so that the average UE and EU transition
rates are the same in the model and in the data. In the model, the UE rate is given by
hue = p(θu)mu,a n dt h eE Ur a t ei sg i v e nb yheu =[
P
d(z)g(z)]/(1 − u).I n t h e d a t a ,
we measure these transition rates following the methodology developed by Shimer (2005).11
Speciﬁcally, we measure the UE rate in month t as hue
t = us
t+1/(1−ut),w h e r eut is the CPS
unemployment rate in month t, and us
t+1 is the CPS short-term unemployment rate in month
t +1 . Similarly, we measure the EU rate in month t as heu
t =1− (ut+1 − us
t+1)/ut.
11There are two diﬀerences between the cyclical measures of the UE and EU rates constructed by Shimer
(2005) and ours. First, Shimer multiplies the short-term unemployment rate by 1.1 in every month after
February 1994 in order to correct for the fact that the 1994 redesign of the CPS changed the way in which
unemployment duration is measured. In this paper, we follow Elsby et al. (2009) who argue that the
short-term unemployment rate should be multiplied by 1.15 not 1.1. Second, Shimer computes the cyclical
component of the log of quarterly workers’ transition rates by using an HP-ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter
of 100,000. In this paper, we use an HP-ﬁlter with the more standard smoothing parameter of 1600.
33We normalize λu to 1, and we choose λe so that the average EE transition rate is
the same in the model as in the data. The EE rate in the model is given by hee =
[
P
(1 − d(z))λep(θe(z))me(z)g(z)]/(1 − u). The EE rate in the data has been measured
by Nagypál (2008) using the CPS microdata. Speciﬁcally, Nagypál measures the EE rate
in month t as hee
t = st/et,w h e r est is the number of workers who are employed at diﬀerent
ﬁrms in months t and t +1 ,a n det is the number of workers who are employed in month t.
We choose γ so that the elasticity of the UE rate with respect to the vacancy-to-
unemployment ratio is the same in the model as in the data. In the model, the vacancy-to-
unemployment ratio is given by v/u, where the aggregate measure of vacancies v is given by
the sum of λuθuu and
P
(1 − d(z))λeθe(z)g(z). In the data, the vacancy-to-unemployment
ratio is measured as the ratio of the Conference Board Help-Wanted Index and the CPS
unemployment rate.
We normalize μz to 0. We choose the scale νz and shape σz parameters in the distribution
of the idiosyncratic productivity to minimize the distance between the tenure distribution
generated by the model and its empirical counterpart. In the model, the tenure distribution
is deﬁned as the fraction of workers who are employed and have been in the same match
for t years. In the data, the analogous distribution is measured by Diebold, Neumark and
Polsky (1997) using the 1987 CPS tenure supplement.12
We normalize μy to 1,a n dc h o o s eρy and σy so that the average productivity of labor
in the model has the same autocorrelation and standard deviation as in the data. In the
model, the average productivity of labor is measured as π =[
P
(y + z)g(z)]/(1−u).I nt h e
data, average labor productivity is measured as the CPS output per worker in the non-farm
business sector. Note that, because the distribution of workers across matches with diﬀerent
idiosyncratic productivity may vary over time, the autocorrelation and standard deviation
of average labor productivity need not be the same as ρy and σy. Finally, we choose b so
that the ratio of the value of leisure to the average productivity of labor is 0.71,t h ev a l u e
recently estimated by Hall and Milgrom (2008).
12Diebold, Neumark and Polsky (1997) also show that the empirical tenure distribution is stable over time.
For this reason, it is appropriate to compare the empirical tenure distribution observed in 1987 with the
tenure distribution generated by the steady-state of the model.
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37Table 1: Summary Statistics, Quarterly U.S. Data
xu v h ue heu hee π
std(x)/std(π) 9.56 10.9 5.96 5.48 5.98 1
autocorr(x) .872 .909 .822 .698 .597 .760
u 1 -.902 -.916 .778 -.634 -.283
v – 1 .902 -.778 .607 .423
corr(·,x) hue – – 1 -.677 .669 .299
heu – – – 1 -.301 -.528
hee –––– 1. 2 0 8
π ––––– 1
Notes: The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate, u, is constructed by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The seasonally
adjusted help wanted advertising index, v, is constructed by the Conference Board.
The UE and EU rates, hue and heu, are constructed from the seasonally adjusted
unemployment rate and the short-term unemployment rate as explained in Appendix
D. The EE rate, hee, is constructed by Nagypál (2007) from the CPS microdata as
explained in Appendix D. The variables u, v, hue, heu and hee are quarterly averages
of monthly series. Average labor productivity, π, is seasonally adjusted real average
output per worker in the non-farm business sector constructed by the BLS. The series
for u, v, hue, heu and π cover the period 1951(I)-2006(II). The series for hee covers
the period 1994(I)-2006(II). The standard deviation of hee is expressed relative to the
standard deviation of π over the period 1994(I)-2006(II), and the correlation of hee with
u, v, hue, heu and π refers to the period 1994(I)-2006(II). All variables are reported
in logs as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 1600.
38Table 2: Calibration Outcomes
Description EXP INS P-00 MP-94
β discount factor .996 .996 .996 .996
b home productivity .907 .716 .710 .739
λu oﬀ the job search 1 1 11
λe on the job search .735 .904 00
γ elasticity of p wrt θ .600 .250 .270 .270
k vacancy cost 1.55 2.37 1.85 1.89
δ exogenous destruction .012 .026 .026 .012
μz average idiosyncratic prod. 0 0 0 0
σz scale idiosyncratic. prod. .952 .008 0 .467
αz shape idiosyncratic prod. 4 10 – 10
Notes: Calibrated parameters for diﬀerent versions of the model. The column EXP
refers to the version of the model in which matches are experience goods. The column
INS refers to the version of the model in which matches are inspection goods. The
column P-00 refers to a version of the experience model in which the parameters λe
and σz are constrained to be equal to zero. The column MP-94 refers to a version of
the experience model in which the parameter λe is constrained to be equal to zero.
Table 3: Experience Model
xu v v u ve hue heu hee π
std(x)/std(π) 7.88 2.54 4.29 8.21 2.51 6.23 5.59 1
autocorr(x) .850 .637 .748 .824 .799 .772 .823 .762
u 1 -.807 .841 -.980 -.976 .972 -.979 -.977
corr(·,x) v – 1 -.380 .855 .897 -.898 .858 .894
π – – -.729 .984 .999 -.979 .983 1
Notes: Summary statistics of the last 6,000 month of a 9,000 month long time series
for u, v, vu, ve, hue, heu, hee,a n dπ generated by the experience model with aggregate
productivity shocks. Section 4 provides details on the stochastic process for productiv-
ity. All variables are quarterly averages of monthly series. All variables are reported
in logs as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 1600.
39Table 4: P-00 and MP-94 Models
P-00 Model
xu v = vu hue heu π
std(x)/std(π) 0.82 2.69 0.91 0 1
autocorr(x) .815 .677 .994 1 .745
u 1 -.932 -.936 0 -.972
corr(·,x) v – 1 . 9 9 00. 9 9 0
π –– . 9 9 9 01
MP-94 Model
std(x)/std(π) 5.98 4.55 0.83 6.61 1
autocorr(x) .674 .453 .740 .397 .736
u 1 .726 -.737 .906 -.732
corr(·,x) v – 1 -.267 .481 -.259
π – – .998 -.583 1
Notes: Summary statistics of the last 6,000 month of a 9,000 month long time series for
u, v, vu, hue, heu and π generated by a version of the experience model in which the
parameters λe and σz are constrained to be equal to zero. All variables are quarterly
averages of monthly series. All variables are reported in logs as deviations from an HP
trend with smoothing parameter 1600.
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